Omnipotence Has No Qualifications

By R.T. Mullins

Omnipotence does not suffer a death by a thousand qualifications because it does not have any qualifications.

When you look at the different definitions of omnipotence on offer in analytic philosophy of religion, there are two broad approaches. The first approach is to articulate omnipotence as God having maximal power. The second approach is to offer an analysis of divine action, or what God can do. I prefer the first approach because I think it informs the question of what God can do. It carves reality at its joints better than focusing on actions alone. As I see it, much of Thomas Jay Oord’s critique of omnipotence focuses on the second approach, or the statements about what God can do. But Oord’s focus can also be seen as critiquing a third approach that I mainly find in theology. This third approach to omnipotence focuses on what God does. I think it is fair to critique the second and third approaches because a great deal of theology and philosophy tends to be obsessed with these. I think there are various reasons why this is the case. Allow me to briefly mention two.

First, I think that one reason philosophers get obsessed with focusing on “what actions can God perform?” is because it generates a lot more discussion than maximal power. Philosophers love to talk, and we need an excuse to keep the conversation going. In a bit I will give my definition of omnipotence in terms of maximal power. The definition does not take much to unpack. It is pretty straightforward. In fact, it is so straightforward and concise that it makes it difficult for me to write a whole chapter on.

Second, I think there is a reason why theologians tend to focus more on “what actions does God perform?” In much of contemporary theology, a lot of arguments basically boil down to “My God could beat up your God.” In the minds of many Calvinists, if God does not causally determine everything that happens, then God is somehow abdicating His sovereignty and displaying weakness. In other words, if God is not offering some vulgar display of power, then He is not really omnipotent. As I see it, this is not terribly helpful, and is often nothing more than a theological pissing contest. In my view, God has maximal power, and there are lots of different ways He can use that power. One option for God is to causally determine everything, and another option is to create a world with creatures who have genuine causal power and autonomy. God has maximal power either way, and He has the freedom to choose how He wants to use that power.

You are probably wondering what this maximal power approach is with respect to omnipotence. I say that omnipotence is maximal power, or the most power-granting set of abilities and no liabilities. Liabilities or weaknesses are logically excluded by the very meaning of “most power-granting set of abilities.” The idea is that there are various things that we can say in English that, on the surface, sound like an ability, but really are a weakness. For example, in English I can say that I have the ability to perform irrational actions. But this so-called ability is not really a power. It is a liability or weakness. If God has the most power-granting set of abilities, that logically entails that God has maximal cognitive power. Part of having maximal cognitive power involves perfect rationality and the power to know all of the facts. If you have the perfect power to know all the facts, and you have perfect rationality, then it is logically impossible to perform irrational actions. Hence, why I said that maximal power logically excludes any liabilities or weaknesses.

Tom does not critique this definition of omnipotence. He actually affirms that God has maximal power. Part of Tom’s alternative to omnipotence is what he calls amipotence, or loving power. Tom says that God’s amipotence involves God having maximal power. You might be thinking, “What is Tom critiquing? How is Tom not just affirming omnipotence, but calling it something else?” I think those are good questions.

What Tom does is he looks at a whole range of different theologians, and examines what they say about omnipotence. Tom says there are three common meanings of omnipotence. These three common meanings of omnipotence are the target of his critique. All of these focus on divine action instead of maximal power.

1) God exerts all power.

2) God can do absolutely anything.

3) God can control others or circumstances.

Notice how (1) and (3) focus on what actions God does perform. (2) focuses on what actions God can perform. I think that number (2) is the only thing close to a real definition of omnipotence in terms of divine action. In fact, it is often said to be an entailment from maximal power. I am not persuaded that Tom has successfully argued against the claim that God can do absolutely anything. But I will return to that later when I talk about Tom’s argument “Death by a Thousand Qualifications.” So let’s focus on the other two definitions for a bit.

When it comes to (1) and (3), I say that Tom has not exposed a problem for omnipotence. Instead, Tom has exposed the total depravity of theologians. Theologians have this tendency to take a doctrine that has relatively minimal content, and then they try to shove their preferred model of God in there. Or they will try to force all of their theological and political beliefs into a doctrine that seems completely unrelated to the doctrine in question. This is a pervasive problem across all groups of theologians. I see it in Calvinism, process theism, and liberation theology. Theologians from all camps have a corrupt tendency to force their preferred ideology into doctrines that should have very minimal content.

As I see it, the real problem is that theologians are confusing God’s power with divine action. There is a difference between God having power, and the question of what God does with that power. For example, John Duns Scotus argues that the method of perfect being theology can help us discern that God is omnipotent, but Scotus says that perfect being theology cannot tell us what God would do with that power. A lot of different debates in Western philosophical theology have revolved around this distinction. For example, the debates between creation ex nihilo and eternal creation were in large part focused on what God would do with His maximal power.

The other essays in this volume are going to discuss Tom’s criticisms of (1) and (3), so I will say no more about that. I want to focus on the objection to (2). Here is the big idea of Tom’s “Death by a Thousand Qualifications.” Start with the definition of omnipotence that God can do absolutely everything. You assure me that God can do absolutely everything. Ok, cool. Now let’s examine all of the things that philosophers and theologians say God cannot do. Scholastic and analytic theologians are obsessed with cataloging all of the logically impossible things that God cannot do. Tom lists forty-nine different things that philosophers say God cannot do. Forty-nine! That is quite a long list. God cannot tell a lie. God cannot sin. God cannot cease to exist. God cannot make 2+2=5. God cannot change the past. God cannot…and on it goes.

The rhetorical force of this argument is quite strong. You see these people say God can do absolutely anything, then you start seeing all of these qualifications that God cannot do this or that. The sheer number of qualifications should make you feel a bit embarrassed to assert that God can do absolutely anything.

Without any embarrassment, I say that omnipotence does not face any qualifications. God has the most power-granting set of abilities and no liabilities. The most power-granting set of abilities logically excludes liabilities. I am even happy to say that this maximal power entails that God has the ability to perform any action that does not involve some kind of liability. You might think that my exclusion of actions involving a liability is a qualification. I disagree. I just have to add the no liability part in the sentence because people are stupid, and don’t always see the logical entailments. Liabilities are logically excluded from the very meaning of maximal power. Liabilities are logically impossible for a maximally powerful being, and what is logically impossible is not a qualification.

I know that sounds controversial. It is very common for theologians and philosophers to say that they are making a qualification when they say that God cannot do this or that logically impossible thing. I just think they are confused about the meaning of “qualification.” When theologians and philosophers say that God cannot do the logically impossible, I deny that they are making a qualification. Qualifications are exceptions to the rule, or exceptions to an absolute. God’s inability to do logically impossible things is not an exception to any rule. The inability to do logically impossible things is the rule, it is an absolute truth. Logical impossibilities are logically impossible, end of story. They just are, and everything in reality fits the description of “Not able to do the logically impossible.” If the inability to do the logically impossible literally applies to everything, then it is not a qualification to say, “God cannot do the logically impossible.” It is not an exception to the rule. It is the rule.

So the scholastic and analytic obsession with cataloging all of the logically impossible things that God cannot do is just really weird. It makes no sense to me because I do not believe that it is conveying anything terribly interesting. I do not believe that it adds anything of significance to our understanding of omnipotence or maximal power. Can God create a square circle? Of course not. That is a silly question. Can God change the past? No. That is not how time works. Stop getting your metaphysics from time travel movies that treat time like a bad spatial metaphor. Can God make 2+2=5? No. Stop it. That is not how mathematics works.

I think the only point where things get interesting is this. There are debates over what is logically possible. Logical contradictions are not always easy to spot. You cannot always easily identify them. Not every contradiction immediately presents itself as A and not-A. Think about the square circle example. The contradiction is not on the surface. You have to think about it for a second. Once you reflect on the fact that squares have sides and circles have no sides, you see the contradiction. God cannot make a thing that has sides and no sides. Other examples are even more difficult to find the contradiction. Can God determine you to perform free actions? That depends what you think free will is. If it is logically impossible, you have not qualified what an omnipotent God can do. All you have done is identified another logical impossibility.

So I do not think that omnipotence suffers a death by a thousand qualifications because I do not think that there are any qualifications here. All we have from Tom is a list of logical impossibilities. The inability to do the logically impossible is the absolute rule. Thus, creating a list of such impossibilities is not creating a list of qualifications.

Bio: R.T. Mullins has a PhD from the University of St Andrews and a Dr. Habil. from the University of Helsinki. He is a lecturer in philosophy and theology at the University of Lucerne, a docent of dogmatics at the University of Helsinki, and a visiting professor of philosophy at Palm Beach Atlantic University.

OORD’S RESPONSE

I think Ryan Mullins is right that I think of divine power more in terms of what God can and can’t do. I don’t think his alternative focus, which is on maximal divine power, is specific enough to help us answer key questions most people ask. After all, I say God has maximal power, but so can the theological determinist. But we have very different views about what God’s up to. I believe a focus upon what actions God can perform is crucial to answering whether God can stop evil. Appeals to “maximal power” aren’t specific enough.

Ryan defines omnipotence as God having the most power-granting set of abilities and no liabilities. This sounds very much likes the maximal power claim he offers, including the fact that it is short on specifics of what God can and can’t do. I’d like more.

Perhaps the main difference between Ryan and me comes down to helping people think through objections to omnipotence that come from questions like the problem of evil and divine hiddenness. Appealing to God‘s maximal power makes little headway in solving those conundrums. Not only does the average believer want more explanation of what God can do than appeals to maximal power can provide, but professional scholars like me would also like more too.For more on Oord’s view of maximal power, see this article.