Must Omnipotence Die So Amipotence May Live?
By Austin Pounds
Omnipotence and amipotence need not conflict when both describe God’s power.
In his most recent work The Death of Omnipotence and Birth of Amipotence, Doctor Thomas Jay Oord has given the church and theological academy much to consider about the legitimacy of omnipotence as an appropriate descriptor of divine power. Oord argues that omnipotence has been qualified to the point that it is all but useless as a defining attribute of God.[1] However, this book isn’t just a eulogy for omnipotence. It also serves to give an alternative to the classical attribute by introducing the term amipotence as a substitute to omnipotence by contextualizing God’s power in light of the superior attribute of divine love.[2] While amipotence breathes new life into the long-standing debate about how to rationalize God’s power logically and systematically, does its birth necessitate the death of omnipotence? Oord believes so, which is why he says, “Omnipotence is dead. Long live amipotence!”[3]
Contrary to Oord, this essay will seek a middle ground in concluding that amipotence offers a more nuanced understanding of omnipotence rather than an alternative to it. In other words, amipotence acts in the same way dynamic omniscience does when referring to God’s knowledge. Dynamic omniscience clarifies that God’s knowledge of past and present events are exhaustive because those are set realities, while knowledge of settled future events is unattainable for God because the future is open and dynamic with the exception of future events that are determined by forces of nature or divine decree.[4] Dynamic omniscience doesn’t do away with omniscience (the idea that God knows all that can be known) but instead gives more detail to what God can know given the ontological state of reality. Likewise, I believe amipotence, rather than burying omnipotence, gives more detail to what God’s power is like given God’s nature as uncontrolling love.
What is Omnipotence and is it Qualified to Death?
As noted above, Oord believes that omnipotence, “dies the death of a thousand qualifications.”[5] This is a strong claim, but it is one which Oord backs up considerably throughout the book as he shows that God’s power must come with stipulations and limitations. However, just because something must be qualified does not mean the term becomes pointless. Before I get to that, there must be some analysis of what omnipotence entails.
Oord makes it clear early on that there are multiple meanings of omnipotence given by scholars throughout church history.[6] He does, however, believe that omnipotence indicates, at least, one of three things:
1. God exerts all power.
2. God can do absolutely anything.
3. God can control others or circumstances.[7]
Oord, throughout the book, gives robust reasons as to why these three markers of omnipotence fall apart when one looks at them through Scripture and through logic. However, I am not sure that one must affirm these as being central to omnipotence. I also don’t think Oord’s critique of the third marker is as strong as the first two, mainly because one could argue that there are restrictions as to why God can’t control circumstances or agents at one point but can in another. Generally, I would say there is something about God’s ordained power that stifles God from completely controlling the situation so that God gets exactly what he desires.[8] However, one can even agree with Oord that God can’t control circumstances or other agents while also maintaining that God is omnipotent.
C.S. Lewis defined omnipotence as, “the power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to him, but not nonsense.”[9] Other theologians and philosophers affirm this definition as well. Thomas Aquinas, for example, states that, “Power is said in reference to possible things.”[10] In other words, omnipotence entails that God can do all things that are logically possible for God to do. This is the most coherent definition of omnipotence. Oord briefly addresses this understanding of omnipotence in his chapter Death by a Thousand Qualifications.
As far as I can tell, he offers two critiques to this particular understanding of omnipotence. The first is that there are possibilities which can be done by other agents but not by God, which means that God can’t do all things that are possible.[11] For example, I can choose not to exist since I am a contingent being, but God must exist because he is a necessary being. Non-existence is a possibility for me, but not for God. This argument would have more force if the definition of omnipotence being offered was, “God can actualize all possibilities.” Then one can look at all the possibilities not available to God either because of their ontological impossibility to actualize (such as making a square circle) or because of the necessary and perfect nature of God (i.e. God can’t stop existing) as a counter to such a claim.
The definition of omnipotence I offered as being the most coherent, however, stresses that God can do all logically possible things. It isn’t logically possible for a necessary being to stop existing. It also isn’t logically possible for any being to create contradictory things. Saying God can’t do these things isn’t a mark against divine power, it is simply stating there are impossibilities in reality either for any agent to accomplish or for certain agents to accomplish.
Oord’s second criticism suggests that this definition of omnipotence doesn’t add anything of substance to what God’s power is like.[12] He says, “It’s like saying, ‘Alexa can do whatever Alexa can do.”[13] This is a much more substantial critique. However, this definition does add something substantial since it distinguishes God’s power from all other beings. If God can actualize every logical possibility, then this sets him apart from a contingent being who can’t actualize every logical possibility. For example, even though it is logically possible that I could become a professional football player, I currently lack the physical ability and capacity to do so. Therefore, there is a logical possibility which I can’t actualize because of my own physical limitations to do so. Here is a deductive argument to capture the point:
Premise 1: It is logically possible for a human being to play professional football.
Premise 2: Austin is a human being.
Premise 3: Austin does not have the physical ability to play professional football.
Therefore: Austin cannot do all that is logically possible for a human being to do.
God, however, is not lacking in capacity or ability when it comes to power. If God can’t do something, then it is because that thing is impossible to do. Omnipotence also stresses that God has the most power compared to any other agent in existence. Such markers do say something about the scope of God’s power, though it doesn’t say everything about God’s power. This is where Oord’s definition of amipotence could bring some fresh insight into the nature of God’s power and add more nuance to what an omnipotent God can and can’t do.
Before getting to that though, I want to look at Oord’s claim regarding qualifications. He argues that “the superlative ‘God is all-powerful’ (omnipotent) requires excessive qualifications. In fact, the number and nature of provisos disqualify omnipotence as an appropriate description of divine power.”[14] To qualify a claim means that one is noting the limits and exceptions to that claim.[15] I think Oord mounts a strong case against most definitions of omnipotence, which ascribe to God no limits to divine power, by demonstrating the limits and exceptions of God’s power. However, the definition given above seems to be unscathed by this charge since it inherently acknowledges that there are impossibilities which God can’t actualize. God has no limits when it comes to the logically possible, but there are things which are logically impossible for God to actualize, and Oord does an amazing job at showing what those are.
Lastly, I want to stress that qualifying doctrine is part of the theological task, and there will be necessary revisions to doctrine as the theologian tests different paradigms or is given new data to work with. Qualifications might lead to the deconstruction of a particular doctrine, but deconstruction isn’t the same as destruction. Reconstruction is also a possibility and should be favored over destruction if the doctrine can still be intelligible and captures some aspect of God’s nature. For example, impassibility, in Classical Theism, generally means that God can’t experience pain or pleasure from another agent. But, in open and relational theology, it can be understood that God’s nature does not change given the experience of another agent. In other words, God will always act in love, goodness, and justice towards creation, regardless of what creation does. Another agent can never make God act in hate, evil, or injustice. This shows that impassibility needs reconstruction rather than destruction once it has been deconstructed from an open and relational lens.
God Can be Amipotent and Omnipotent
Oord’s understanding of divine power (amipotence) as being filtered through divine love is not incompatible with omnipotence. If omnipotence refers to the power to do all that is logically possible, then controlling other agents would be logically impossible for a being whose nature is uncontrolling love. Amipotence clarifies what kind of power God has (the kind which guides, woos, empowers, doesn’t control, etc.…) while omnipotence clarifies the scope of God’s power. God can do anything that is logically possible, and God’s power is greater than any other force or agent in existence.
A more interesting conversation, in my humble opinion, is not whether amipotence kills omnipotence, but rather what are the limits of an amipotent God? For example, given that there are no wills to coerce, can an amipotent God create from nothing? Maybe the ability to create from nothing is part of an amipotent God’s absolute power but is not available to them once creation is there to act on. Unfortunately, this essay can’t explore this topic, but it goes to show the new and fresh conversations amipotence brings to theological discourse. I am grateful to Dr. Oord for extending the theological conversations surrounding God’s power into new areas of inquiry and discovery.
Bio: Austin Pounds is the Director of Christian Education at First Presbyterian Church Moultrie, GA. He recently completed his MDiv at Asbury Theological Seminary, in Wilmore, KY, and is on the verge of completing his THM (Theological Studies) at Asbury as well. He is a theology nerd and a gaming nerd who loves video games and dungeons and dragons
OORD’S DRABBLE* RESPONSE
Austin Pounds wants to affirm both omnipotence and amipotence, and he seeks a middle ground that offers a nuanced understanding of omnipotence. Austin doesn’t think my criticism of the idea that God can control is as strong as my criticism of other views of divine omnipotence. Austin’s argument is similar to others I have heard. I can agree with him that omnipotence could be redefined, but we’d need to tease out the specifics of what God can and can’t do. Saying God can do what is logically possible requires a more complete explanation of what we think logical divine action entails. The Calvinist will say one thing about this, the Arminian another, and I a third. We might all be logically consistent, and yet we each have very different concepts of what God can do.
For more on Oord’s saying that even John Wesley says God can’t do some actions, see this article.
* A drabble is an essay exactly 100 words in length.
[1]. Thomas Jay Oord, The Death of Omnipotence and Birth of Amipotence (Grasmere, ID: SacraSage Press, 2023), 45.
[2]. Ibid., 120-121.
[3]. Ibid., 7.
[4]. John Sanders, “Open Theism” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, April 2015, Accessed Aug 2 2024. https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/open-theism/v-1/sections/basic-
tenets
[5]. Thomas Jay Oord, The Death of Omnipotence, 44.
[6]. Ibid., 2.
[7]. Ibid.
[8]. Ordained power is simply a reference to the kind of power God has once God makes a certain decision. For example, God can’t control our every action if he chooses to create us with a free will.
[9]. C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York, NY: HarperOne Publishing, 2015), 18.
[10]. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.25.3.
[11]. Thomas Jay Oord, The Death of Omnipotence, 48.
[12]. Ibid., 67.
[13]. Ibid.
[14]. Ibid., 45.
[15]. Ibid., 44.