Logic, Definitions, and Why We
Should Look Elsewhere

By J. Aaron Simmons

Oord’s philosophical objections to omnipotence are either overstated or incoherent.

I consider Thomas Jay Oord to be what Aristotle terms a “friend of virtue.” I admire his professional courage, his moral convictions, and his personal investment in so many others. That said, Aristotle and Socrates are right when they suggest that friends should be each other’s best critics. Accordingly, the critique I offer here is meant as an encouragement toward the rigor demanded by the excellence about which I know Oord cares so deeply. Ok, so although I am deeply sympathetic with what motivates Oord’s theological position in The Death of Omnipotence and the Birth of Amipotence, ultimately, the philosophical arguments he presents are so deeply flawed that his conclusions are unsupported and unconvincing.

I am a philosopher and so I will restrict my remarks here to the argument offered against omnipotence in Chapter Two, “Death by a Thousand Qualifications,” which Oord presents as the philosophical chapter (as contrasted with the Biblical and Theological chapters).

First, I want to make clear that I am sympathetic to Oord’s opposition to some ways that omnipotence has been understood and the ends to which such understandings have been put. He is right that some versions of omnipotence “does not inspire hope in everyone” and can often “lead some to unbelief and despair” (4). He is right that some models of omnipotence, when deployed in religious practice, can lead to confusion, disempowerment, and harm (6). He is right to worry that some accounts of omnipotence, when held in relation to other theological notions concerning providence, temporality, along with specific ideas in theocratic political theory, can seem to support the idea that “an all-powerful God installs or permits the actions of every ruler and authoritarian system” (6). He is right that the problem of evil stands as a serious obstacle to some versions of omnipotence such that, on such versions, one would rightly proclaim that we “shouldn’t trust an almighty God who permits evil” (6). Oord is right to highlight all of these issues as serious objections to some versions of omnipotence. That said, he does not qualify any of these claims in the way that I have above—viz., by using the term “some.” In every single case, he simply refers to “omnipotence,” as such. Such a failure to offer responsible awareness of the restricted application of the terms he is using is not just a bug in his presentation, it is a feature of his actual position.

All of Chapter Two is devoted to showing that “qualified omnipotence is lifeless” and that since “omnipotence must be qualified,” we face the realization that “qualified omnipotence is oxymoronic” (5). His argument basically takes the following form:

1.   In order to be coherent, the concept of omnipotence must be unqualified. (By definition)

2.   The concept of omnipotence must be qualified if it is to be meaningful. (Evidentially obvious)

3.   Therefore, the concept of omnipotence is incoherent (from 1 and 2 by modus tollens)

This argument then forms the evidential support, he suggests, for his broader disjunctive syllogism:

4.   Either omnipotence is true or amipotence is (By definition)

5.   Omnipotence is incoherent (from 1-3)

6.   Therefore, amipotence is true (from 4 and 5 by disjunctive syllogism)

Well, here is the problem: Premise 1 is false on Oord’s own terms.

In the introduction, Oord offers a definition of omnipotence such that it obtains whenever one of the following is true: “God exerts all power;” “God can do absolutely anything;” “God can control others or circumstances” (3). That Oord offers such a definition is necessary because there are a variety of ways that “omnipotence” can be understood, and he is rightly limiting the scope of reference and stipulating that any one of these three is a sufficient condition for omnipotence. In this way, he is, as philosophers would say, “precising” the term. In addition to these three precisings, later in Chapter Two he offers one more when he claims that “to many people omnipotence means ‘without qualification’” (44). So, now we seem to have four sufficient conditions offered in order to restrict the reference by which “omnipotence” semantically functions.

In light of this basic realization about scope, he then goes on to stipulate his understanding of the term “qualify.” “To qualify a concept or claim,” Oord writes, “is to note its limits and exceptions. A person qualifies by adding provisos, conditions, modifications, stipulations, or exemptions” (44). On this account of qualification, there simply is no difference between it and providing a precise definition of a term. Definitions necessarily denote the limits and exceptions of semantic application. As such, when Oord offers no less than four such possible definitions of “omnipotence,” he is rightly “qualifying” the term such that it can be meaningfully used in his own book! Notice, further, that if he were not to do this, then his argument against omnipotence would be a non-starter, since he would be attempting to reject a meaningless concept. He can only falsify what is possibly true. He can only reject what is stable enough to bear refutation.

Well, now Oord has directly affirmed a contradiction since the fourth precising dynamic, “without qualification,” stands in direct opposition to each of the initial three stipulative definitional sufficiency conditions. If omnipotence admits of no qualification, by definition, then to claim that omnipotence means that “God exerts all power,” say, is straightaway self-referentially incoherent. That God exerts all power requires that omnipotence is qualified, definitionally, such that omnipotence does not mean that God does not exert all power. Now, I imagine that you are likely to say that this is simply trivial and so I must be missing Oord’s point. Well, I agree that this is, indeed, trivial, and that Oord doesn’t seem to appreciate it is simply egregious.

What Oord terms “qualification” is, within his own account, simply a matter of being precise with our definitions. As such, premise 1 is straightaway false. When he then moves on to list a “thousand qualifications” that apply to “omnipotence,” what he does is just further elaborate on what it means to use the term “omnipotence” in reference to specific longstanding debates. Indeed, despite offering a list of 49 “qualifications,” Oord only actually offers one: God cannot do the logically impossible. Every single item on his list reduces to a matter of logical impossibility. I want to emphasize this point. That God’s omnipotence is understood within the bounds of logical possibility is generally accepted by the vast majority of philosophers and theologians since at least Aquinas and definitely within the contemporary debates in philosophy of religion. It is fine for Oord to suggest that this widespread conception is mistaken, but that would require significant and robust argumentation. That is not, however, what we find in Oord’s account. Instead, in just a few sentences, he seems to assume that he has shown everyone from Aquinas to Plantinga to be wrong. Oord seems to understand this traditional view, given his comments about how it has shown up in the history of philosophy and theology, but that just makes it more problematic that has not met the historical burden of proof on this front.

The main issue, though, is not Oord’s overstated conclusion rejecting the idea that God cannot do the logically impossible, but that the argument he offers does not actually depend on it. Indeed, notice that none of Oord’s own three sufficiency conditions require doing the logically impossible! Ostensibly, Oord seems to take it that the claim “God can do absolutely anything” is contradictory with “God can’t do the logically impossible,” but here it all depends on what we mean by “anything.” Again, Oord’s own account offered in Chapter Two admits that the philosophical debates have almost always understood “anything” to mean “anything logically possible.” As such, there is no incompatibility between this “qualification” of logical possibility and the conditions he has provided.

Let’s push this just a bit further. Most philosophers would likely just respond to Oord that he has successfully shown why philosophers understand omnipotence to mean that “God can exert all power, control others or circumstances, and do absolutely anything within the boundaries of logical possibility.” However, nothing in this necessarily qualified and precise definition means that God must deploy power, enact control, and understand divine agency in such flatfooted ways. Such a definition is not a divine straitjacket, but instead simply a semantic framework by which we human, all too human, inquirers, do our best (fallibly) to understand things as rationally circumscribed. Crucially, Oord must be committed to such rationality, given that his argument depends on a rejection of incoherence.

Once premise 1 is shown to be false, premise 2 becomes trivially true and thus the conclusion in 3 fails to be justified. With 3 now unsupported, the falsification requirement for the disjunctive syllogism offered in 5 also fails. Hence, the philosophical argument that Oord claims to have offered against omnipotence and for amipotence is a logical disaster. Of course, he can suggest that the falsification requirement can be supported independently internal to his biblical and theological objections, but I leave it to others to respond to those directions. When it comes to the philosophical account provided, however, it is not that Oord has failed to give a good argument, but that the argument he offers is so bad, it is hard to take it seriously.

Rather than showing why those versions and understandings of omnipotence that lead to dangerous outcomes are flawed, Oord’s argument can’t even support its own weight. This is unfortunate because a more restrained and careful argument might have successfully demonstrated the problems with some versions of omnipotence, and then even provided reasons to lean toward amipotence as an important corrective. Regrettably, anyone looking for such an argument will need to look elsewhere.

Bio: J. Aaron Simmons is Professor of Philosophy at Furman University. The former President of the Søren Kierkegaard Society (USA), Simmons has published widely in philosophy of religion and continental philosophy. Among his authored and edited books are God and the Other, The New Phenomenology, Christian Philosophy, Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life, and Reexamining Deconstruction and Determinate Religion. Simmons recently published a popular audience book entitled Camping with Kierkegaard, and he writes regularly for his Substack, “Philosophy in the Wild.”

OORD’S RESPONSE

Aaron Simmons thinks my objections to omnipotence are either overstated or incoherent. Aaron thinks that I believe that “in order to be coherent, the concept of omnipotence must be unqualified.“ I don’t make this claim in the book. I think a claim can be coherent and have numerous qualifications. I only claim that omnipotence has so many qualifications that it loses meaning. In other words, I’m making a cumulative case against omnipotence, not a logical one. Consequently, I’ll convince those who believe the cumulative case is strong. Because Aaron misunderstands this crucial point, he moves forward with other concerns that are based on his misunderstanding.

For more on Oord’s view of ways omnipotence must be qualified, see this article.