Is an Amipotent God Preferable
to the God of Freewill Theism?
By David Basinger
While Oord raises important challenges to Freewill Theism, I don’t believe he establishes that Freewill Theism is less reasonable than Amipotism.
Like Thomas Jay Oord, I consider myself an Open Theist. However, Oord and I differ on some key tenets of Open Theists in ways relevant to a number of his key claims in Omnipotence in The Death of Omnipotence and Birth of Amipotence. As initially characterized by those of us who wrote the Openness of God, the God of Open Theism:
1. Not only created this world ex nihilo but can (and at times does) intervene unilaterally in earthly affairs.
2. Chose to create us with incompatibilistic (libertarian) freedom—freedom over which [God] cannot exercise total control.
3. So values freedom—the moral integrity of free creatures and a world in which such integrity is possible—that [God] does not normally override such freedom, even if [God] sees that it is producing undesirable results.
4. Always desires our highest good, both individually and corporately, and thus is affected by what happens in our lives.
5. Does not possess exhaustive knowledge of exactly how we will utilize our freedom although [God] may well at times be able to predict with great accuracy the choices we will freely make.[1]
Characteristics 1-4 are the key tenets of what is often labeled Freewill Theism (Freewill Theism pp. 11-21). Adding characteristic 5, which assumes an open future in ways not accepted by traditional theists, is what led to the label of Open Theism. Oord’s model of Open Theism is based on a rejection of tenets 1-3 in my version of Freewill Theism (FWT).
My goal is not to argue that Oord’s challenges to FWT are misguided and thus need not be taken seriously. My goal is to add what I see as relevant clarifications. I hope those considering Oord’s challenges will keep in mind as they comparatively assess the available options.
Freewill Theism and Divine Omnipotence
Unique to FWT is the belief that an omnipotent God cannot control free human choice. However, Oord maintains that all traditional theists must acknowledge that an omnipotent God can’t do many things. God can’t do that which is logically impossible or incompatible with God’s nature, can’t change the past, etc. A comprehensive list of such qualifications, we are told, “would include thousands, millions, and perhaps billions of qualifications.” Moreover, “attempts to salvage omnipotence do not match what 99.99% of people—both scholars and laity—mean by “God is omnipotent.” “ Accordingly, “based on the enormous number of necessary qualifications… theists [including Freewill Theists] should stop saying, “God is omnipotent” (pp. 71-72).
I question Oord’s assumption that there is a standard meaning of omnipotence accepted by all—namely, that God is all-powerful without qualification—and, thus, that attempts to “qualify” this standard understanding are attempts to water down what it means to say God is omnipotent without having to abandon this very important theistic belief.
I’ve taught thousands of individuals in classes and church settings who came in believing that God was all-powerful. Most had not thought much about what that really meant, and when asked to clarify this belief in light of such things as God’s ability to do that which is logically impossible, to sin, to cease to exist, etc., readily admitted that they had never believed that for God to have all power meant he could do such things. In other words, to generalize what Oord believes to be qualifications to what most actually believe are, as I see it, appropriate clarifications of what most actually believe. And a clarified belief is not a watered-down belief that one need not apologize for or abandon.
If this is so, then Free Will Theists need not be apologetic for maintaining that an omnipotent “God can perform any action the performance of which is logically consistent, consistent with the past up until the present, and consistent with God’s own nature,” as this is a helpful clarification as opposed to a problematic qualification.[2]
Freewill Theism and Divine Control of Human Freedom
Oord characterizes the relationship between God and human freedom in FWT as follows:
While God creates creatures and enables them to exert power, “God occasionally controls creatures by singlehandedly causing outcomes. But usually, God does not; creatures exert the power God voluntarily gives them” (p. 56).
Oord’s main concern, as I see it, is his belief that in those moments when God overrides human choice and brings about what God believes should occur, God is exerting all power and the human has none. Coupled with the belief that to be a creature is to exert power, this leads to the odd conclusion that when God is overriding human decision-making, humans must stop existing or become divine (p. 57).
As I understand FWT, for God to take control of a situation involving human decision-making is not for God to take away the ability of the relevant humans to make decisions; humans retain that power. God does in those cases modify the outcome of decisions—doesn’t allow what would have happened as the result of free choice to occur (and may bring about something different instead). This is akin to a parent overriding a child’s decision not to go to bed by taking the child to bed. The child’s desired outcome was thwarted; the child has lost the ability to act freely. But the ability (power) to make decisions remains.
Freewill Theism and Evil
Oord’s most significant challenge to FWT is the problem of evil. Oord grants that the strongest of the traditional responses to evil is the Freewill focus on misguided human freedom but still finds this response inadequate.
To help assess Oord’s challenges to a Freewill defense, I want to clearly distinguish Theological Determinism from FWT in relation to evil.
Theological Determinism holds that God is all-controlling. Humans are free and responsible for their actions, but God controls even human freedom; all and only that which God has determined should happen does happen. This is normally taken to mean in relation to evil that God causes or allows each specific evil—e.g., the physical or psychological abuse of innocent individuals—because this evil is a necessary condition for another specific state of affairs that is a “greater good”—e.g., the good of overcoming abuse or motivating others to fight abuse. So, there is in this model no gratuitous evil, defined as evil that is not necessary for a greater good.
Freewill Theists believe that God could be all-controlling. However, to the extent that God grants us meaningful freedom, God has voluntarily given up control over what will occur. Accordingly, for Free Will Theists, God does not cause or allow specific evils because they are necessary for some over-compensating specific good in our world. By creating humans with freedom, God made it possible for us to choose to do that which God does not desire we do—e.g., it is possible for human to choose to abuse others. God, along with us, can therefore believe that the specific evils we experience are gratuitous in the sense that the world would be better without them and that we, in partnership with God, should do what we can to minimize and ameliorate the effects of such evil. The greater good in this case is a world with freedom, which allows for gratuitous evil as the unavoidable by-product of God’s creative goal.
Given this clarification, a number of Oord’s challenges to traditional theodicies don’t hold for FWT. Since Free Will Theists acknowledge the existence of gratuitous evil, they need not feel they are going against God’s will by fighting evil or not supporting all political leaders in power or all policies currently in place.
However, a number of challenges to FWT raised by Oord and others do remain. It is perfectly reasonable to ask Free Will Theists to respond, for instance, to the following:
• If God can occasionally intervene and really cares for us, wouldn’t a loving God intervene more frequently to prohibit more of the horrendous evils we are forced to endure?
• Why is it that God doesn’t intervene more in relation to natural, environmental evils since it seems God could do without undermining meaningful human freedom?
Free Will Theists have long been aware of such questions and offer responses.[3] Oord and many others do not find such responses adequate personally, and they can’t see how any reasonable person could: thus, the conclusion that all theists, including Freewill Theists, who think about all this seriously should agree that a traditional conceptualization of omnipotence in any form is dead.
I disagree. Oord has given us good reasons to seriously consider traditional views of omnipotence. However, I don’t believe Oord has established that no theist, including a Free Will Theist, can justifiably continue to affirm a traditional understanding of God’s power vis-à-vis human freedom.
In the last part of Oord’s book, he sets forth a model of God as an Amipotent being. While an Amipotent God at every moment offers to all creatures the best options to choose, God can never singlehandedly determine outcomes. Creatures choose to cooperate with amipotence and choosing not to act as amipotence desires often has harmful results.
However, an Amipotent God’s loving influence makes a real difference to everyone and everything. Although uncontrolling, this love is literally the most powerful force in the universe, and this “provides hope for the victory of good over evil now and in the future” (p. 150).
Oord’s Amipotent God shares a key assumption with the God of Process Theism: the metaphysical claim that God cannot unilaterally control the behavior of humans (or any other entity). Humans (entities) always retain the ability to choose not to act as God would have them act.
A number of years ago, I outlined some implications of this metaphysical claim that I think those who are considering Amipotence should consider.[4]
1. While it is possible that an Amipotent God, with our assistance, could make the world a better place, there is no guarantee (or even strong probability) within the model that the world will become a better place. The amount of gratuitous evil could increase, to the point where, given choices with respect to the environment and increasingly powerful armaments, humanity as we know it will cease to exist. Or to put this in more traditional theological terms, I don’t see any basis in this model, either conceptually or empirically, for assuming that it is more likely than not that good will in fact ultimately triumph over evil.
2. Many traditional theists assume an afterlife in which there will be no more gratuitous evil (no more tears and sorrows), but rather a world that contains only good (a world in which God and humans live in eternal relationship of peace and harmony). However, this assumes that God can somehow bring it about (by changing individuals and/or the environment) that “evil” choices are never made in response to God’s non-coercive influence, something I don’t see the model allowing.
Answers may exist, but questions like these must be considered as we compare the various self-consistent models of God I believe can justifiably be affirmed.
Bio: David Basinger recently retired from his role as Chief Academic Officer at Roberts Wesleyan University but continues to teach courses in philosophical theology on an adjunct basis. He earned his PhD in philosophy from the University of Nebraska. His research interests remain divine attributes, religious pluralism, and bioethics. His most recent book is God and Human Genetic Engineering (Cambridge, 2023).
OORD’S DRABBLE* RESPONSE
David Basinger presents a fine essay, and I’ll address some of his concerns about amipotence while responding to future essays. But quickly: 1. I don’t assume a universally accepted definition of omnipotence, but I recognize three common meanings. 2. David is correct that my view rejects guaranteed eschatological victories coming through God overpowering creatures. 3. I believe free will persists in the afterlife. 4. My main criticism of David’s view is his claim that God can “modify the outcomes of decisions.” If God interrupts the causal outcomes of free will, I don’t see how creatures can be praiseworthy or blameworthy.
For more on Oord’s view of various meanings of omnipotence, see this article.
For more on Oord’s view of God’s uncontrolling love winning in the afterlife, see this article.
For more on Oord’s view of free will/freedom, see this article.
* A drabble is an essay exactly 100 words in length.
[1]. Clark Pinnock, The Openness of God (InterVarsity Press, 1994), 156.
[2]. David Basinger, The Case for Freewill Theism (InterVarsity Press, 1996), 23-25.
[3]. Basinger, Freewill Theism, 83-104.
[4]. David Basinger, Divine Power in Process Theism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 69-84.