Amipotence as a Solution to the Problem of Divine Hiddenness
By Chad Bahl
The traditional view of omnipotence cannot provide a satisfactory solution to Schellenberg’s Problem of Divine Hiddenness. God as amipotent offers an attractive resolution.
In his book, The Death of Omnipotence and the Birth of Amipotence, Thomas Jay Oord scrutinizes the traditional doctrine of divine omnipotence, concluding that it is a doctrine neither born of Scripture nor one which stands up to philosophic scrutiny.[1] This is a conclusion I agree with, and in doing so, it has helped me solve some of my most troublesome theological questions.
Offloading omnipotence is particularly helpful when addressing issues of theodicy. In Oord’s words, “It’s hard to exaggerate the benefits of saying God is not omnipotent. A God who cannot control creatures or circumstances is not morally responsible for failing to prevent evil.”[2] Again, I agree with the sentiment. Realistically, a primary pillar of atheism falls when the problem of evil is resolved. Jettisoning omnipotence solves the problem of evil.
But it is not satisfying to simply say ‘God is not omnipotent’ without being prepared to talk of God’s power in a way that comports with our deepest intuitions about the God-world relationship. So, in place of omnipotence, Oord offers a solution he monikers amipotence.
Amipotence combines two Latin words ami (love)and potens (power or influence). For Oord, amipotence is a way of speaking to God’s priority of love over power in the God-world relationship. Because God’s love is as necessary an attribute of God than is God’s very existence, God can never act in a way that is not loving. The conceptual implications are many, but key among them for Oord is that “because love is inherently uncontrolling, neither divine nor creaturely love controls.”[3] An amipotent God can never intervene in such a way that unilaterally determines outcomes. God can persuade, but God cannot compel.
The purpose of this essay is to explore the implications of amipotence for the Problem of Divine Hiddenness.
The Problem of Divine Hiddenness
Besides theodicy, an argument levied by atheists against the existence of God is Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness.[4] Schellenberg presents his case in nuanced form as follows:
1. If God exists, then God is perfectly loving toward such finite persons as there may be. [Premise]
2. If God is perfectly loving toward such infinite persons as there may be, then for any capable finite person S and time t, God is at time t open to being in a positive meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship (a personal relationship) with S and t. [Premise]
3. If God exists, then for any capable finite person S and time t, God is at time t open to being in a personal relationship with S at t. [1,2 by Hypothetical Syllogism]
4. If for any capable finite person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a personal relationship with S at t, then for any capable finite person S and time t it is not the case that S is at t nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. [Premise]
5. If God exists, then for any capable finite person S and time t, it is not the case that S is at t nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. [3,4 by Hypothetical Syllogism]
6. There is at least one capable finite person S and time t such that S is or was at t nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. [Premise]
7. It is not the case that God exists. [5,6 by Modus Tollens][5]
In sum, Schellenberg argues that if someone is open to the possibility God exists, God will make Godself known to that person in a clear and meaningful way. Why this does not always occur is known as ‘the problem of divine hiddenness.’
On its face, this may seem like a compelling argument for atheism, especially if one presupposes a God who is able to intervene in such a way as to unilaterally control outcomes. Put differently, it is belief in the traditional doctrine of omnipotence, not God, which creates this philosophical conundrum. For those with such a worldview, they must reason some greater good behind God not choosing to appear in front of the seeker and speak directly to her.
This task may appear quite difficult. It is one, however, that Randall Price attempts in his article on the topic.[6] Price concedes that Schellenberg’s argument is logically sound. He is also willing to grant (as most theists do) premise 1 that God is perfectly loving toward all finite persons. Price, however, takes issue with premise 2, which states God is always open to personal relationships with these persons. He instead asserts a loving God may be “temporarily not open” to such relationships, claiming the situation to sometimes be “far more complicated.”[7] Price adds “God’s redemptive and eschatological plans for humanity [involve] elevated long-term goods over short term.”[8] Indeed, “God [may] refrain from revealing [Godself] for a time, and even allow [people] to suffer a great deal by withholding [God’s] presence.”[9]
Price cites several Old Testament examples to bolster his case, including 1-2 Samuel, in which God’s presence to the Israelites focuses primarily on the Ark of the Covenant in the Temple. The Israelites are able to enjoy fellowship with God until in 1 Samuel 4, where the Israelites take the Ark into battle with the Philistines without first consulting God. (In doing this they hoped for a swift victory.) However, because of their error in judgment, God allows the Philistines not only to defeat the Israelites, but to carry away the Ark, signifying the loss of God’s presence. Price concludes that the greater good in the story is God being temporarily closed off to the Israelites “in order to correct their theological errors and restore them to a proper relationship.”[10] Price then demonstrates how a similar theme runs through the Babylonian Exile.[11]
On the surface, Price’s argument may sound like a promising answer for the problem of divine hiddenness. Upon further examination, it offers anything but. While Price cites the above examples as reasons why God may temporarily hide the divine presence in order to offer deeper personal relationships, he fails to mention the many who died as a result of the Philistine victory or the generation lost to the 70-year Babylonian exile. For those who perished, it is not hard to concede that God’s absence was anything but temporary. Further, Price admits God may have taken an easier path in order to correct the errors of the Israelites, citing the possibility of God intervening more gently and in more obvious ways. However, he asserts, “the point remains that God retains the prerogative to teach people in whatever way [God] sees fit.”[12]
In the end, Price’s response to Schellenberg may not offer a very palatable solution to the skeptic. But, as one who asserts God’s capacity for ‘at will’ intervention, this may be the only option at hand. Sadly, this may only reinforce the skeptic’s disbelief. Omnipotence perpetuates, rather than solves, the problem of divine hiddenness.
Amipotence Offers a Solution to Divine Hiddenness
Advocates of omnipotence appear incapable of providing a satisfactory answer to Schellenberg’s proposition. It is unreasonable to expect a skeptic to believe God willfully withholds God’s presence at times for the purpose of achieving a greater good, especially in circumstances during which a wake of collateral damage is left behind. Certainly, if God is able to intervene, then there is no sufficient reason not to do so.
An amipotent God, on the other hand, is able to woo, to love and to lure, but is never able to single-handedly control outcomes. God can call out, but it is up to the seeker to listen. God can provide a warm embrace, but the doubter must be willing to see the divine at work in and around her. God can appear, but it may only be in the form of a still, small voice in the skeptic’s deepest intuitions. Because God is love, God cannot make you do anything, including believe.
The implications for Schellenberg’s argument are not far-fetched. Schellenberg’s theory rests on the presumption that God is able to make Godself known in a clear and unambiguous way. But amipotence presupposes freedom for all beings; so monolithic revelation becomes nearly impossible.
In a strange way, this is great news. Whereas the believer in omnipotence must conclude God is hiding, the proponent of amipotence is able to confidently assert, “God is not hiding. God is trying.”
Amipotence resolves divine hiddenness.
Bio: Chad Bahl is a DThM candidate at Northwind Theological Seminary, where he studies Open and Relational Theology. Bahl is the author of several books, including Mornings with Schleiermacher: A Devotional Inspired by the Father of Modern Theology, and is author/editor of Deconstructing Hell: Open and Relational Responses to the Doctrine of Eternal Conscious Torment.
OORD’S DRABBLE* RESPONSE
Chad Bahl examines amipotence to tackle a key question believers often ask: why isn’t God more obvious? This is the problem of divine hiddenness, a challenge that undermines many theologies. An omnipotent God could voluntarily hide or fail to reveal clearly, but amipotence offers a different explanation. A God who cannot control also cannot guarantee crystal-clear revelation. Those receiving divine communication must strive to be attuned to the voice of this uncontrolling lover. Chad is right that this lack of control is good news. If God could deliver a clear message but chooses not to, God wouldn’t be perfectly loving.
For more on Oord’s view of why a hidden God leads some to atheism, see this article.
* A drabble is an essay exactly 100 words in length.
[1]. Thomas Jay Oord, The Death of Amipotence and the Birth of Omnipotence. (Nampa, IA: SacraSage Press, 2023), 1-7.
[2]. Ibid, 119-120.
[3]. Ibid, 122.
[4]. See J.L. Schellenberg. The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.)
[5]. Ibid, 24-25.
[6]. See Randall Price. Divine Hiddenness and Christian Theism: A Biblical Theodicy. Perichoresis. Volume 21. Issue 3 (2023): 55-74.
[7]. Ibid, 57,61.
[8]. Ibid, 62.
[9]. Ibid.
[10]. Ibid, 63.
[11]. Ibid, 63-65.
[12]. Ibid 69.